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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce action. Each party sought a divorce 
from the other, and each sought property distribution and inci-
dental relief. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson. The first day of trial was held on May 31, 1979, 
and the trial was completed on the 2nd day of trial, which was 
August 21, 1979. At the conclusion of trial, the Court granted 
each of the parties a divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty; 
custody of the four minor children of the parties was (pursuant 
to stipulation) awarded to the plaintiff with reasonable visita-
tion in the defendant; and the Court took under advisement the 
other issues pending submission of memoranda. With respect to 
the issues thus determined, the Court entered Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law (R67-70) and a Decree of Divorce (R77,78) on 
September 14, 1979. In accordance with the Court's prior deter-
mination, the Decree awarded each of the parties a divorce, 
awarded custody of the children to the plaintiff, subject to 
reasonable visitation in the defendant, directed that the fore-
going provisions be final on entry, and noted that all other 
issues had been taken under advisement. 
Thereafter, on October 5, 1979, the Court filed its 
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Memorandum Decision (R98-100), and proposed Findings, Conclusions 
were then prepared (RlSJ,158) each of the parties having there-
tofore submitted memoranda as requested by the Court at the trial 
(Rl04-119) and (R49-63), and both parties filed motions objecting 
thereto. Defendant's objections are found at Rl46-148 and Rl63-
164, and plaintiff's objections are found at RlSl-152. A hearing 
was had on these objections on October 16, 1979, (RISO) and the 
Court directed that the defendant submit a written memorandum in 
support of her position by October 19 and that the plaintiff 
respond thereto by October 26. The defendant submitted her 
Memorandum on October 23, 1979 (an extension having b,een granted) 
(Rl76-180) with a proffered Affidavit (Rl82-190). Plaintiff filed 
his response October 26, 1979, {Rl65-172) along with a Motion to 
Strike the aforesaid Affidavit (Rl73-4) . The matter was then 
argued orally on October 29, 1979, and the Court took the objec-
tions under advisement. (The Court disregarded said affidavit (R288-9)) 
The Court thereupon entered an Amendment to Memorandum 
Decision on December 14, 1979 (Rl91-92). Thereupon the Supple-
mental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on 
January 15, 1980 (R220-225), in accordance with the Court's 
Memorandum Decision (R98-100) as amended (Rl91-192), and a 
Supplemental Decree entered the same date (R226-230) . 
The Supplemental Decree granted plaintiff the following 
property, to-wit: Furniture - $3, 000; automobile (van) - $6,000; 
savings account - $488.76; checking account - $200; and other 
-2-
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miscellaneous personal and business property. The Court awarded 
the home to the plaintiff, subject to a $13,500 lien in favor of 
the defendant, payable when plaintiff sells the home, ceases to 
use it as a residence, or when the youngest child reaches major-
ity, whichever occurs first~ a vested profit sharing plan in 
the amount of $124.57 and a vested stock plan in the amount of 
$108.78, one-half the cash value of the life insurance ($5,032). 
(The values are those found by the Court.) 
The defendant was awarded jewelry - $4,000 and miscel-
laneous personal property. She was awarded $1.00 per year ali-
mony. She was awarded $97,320.22 cash, and she was awarded a 
$13,500 lien against the house, and was awarded one-half of the 
cash value of the life insurance of $5,032.00. (The values are 
those found by the Court.) 
The plaintiff was ordered to pay the debts of the 
parties in the sum of $7,310.45, and each of the parties was 
required to assume one-half of the debt to the plaintiff's par-
ents, which amounted to $5,102.50 each. 
that: 
The Court stated in its Findings of Fact (Paragraph 19) 
"The Court finds that the plaintiff has sustained 
trauma and medical problems resulting from the defendant's 
injuries and condition as a result thereof; The Court has 
taken this into consideration, together with the responsi-
bility and the expense which plaintiff will have in raising 
the minor children in determining what is fair and equit-
able between the parties." (R223) (Substantially the same 
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provision is set forth in the Court's Amendment to Memorandum 
Decision (Rl92). 
Thereupon defendant filed a Notice of Appeal (R231) 
and plaintiff filed a Statement of Points on cross-Appeal (R241, 242). 
Note: The sum of $97,320.22, the total net proceeds 
from the malpractice action (after attorney's fees and costs) was 
derived in two phases. The sum of $85,346 was received by reason 
of settlement with the anesthesiologist (R41,43) and is the sum 
covered in the original Memorandum Decision (para. 8 at R99) . 
At the time of the oral arguments on October 29, 1979, 
dealing with the objections of the parties to the Court's pro-
posed Findings and Conclusions, the second phase of the malprac-
tice action had been settled for $21,000 against the hospital and 
the Court duly advised (R255,267). 
Thus the Court, in its Amendment to Memorandum Decision, 
(Rl92) with the total settlement before him, awarded defendant not 
only the original $85,346, but also gave her all of the net proce~ 
from the second phase of approximately $12,000 (para. 1 at Rl91). 
The final net amount after attorney's fees and costs turned out to 
be $11,974.22 (R216,219) for a total thus of $97,320.22. In so 
doing the Court reduced the defendant's lien against the house by 
the sum of $13, 500 to a total lien of $13, 500. (In the said Amend-
ment the Court also increased the amount payable to the parents fro 
$4,930 to $10,205, with each required to pay one-half thereof. Thi 
amounted to an increase of $2,637.50 to each party for this item.) 
-4-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
In her appeal the defendant and appellant raises three 
issues: (1) that the plaintiff should not be awarded a divorce; 
(2) that the defendant should not be ordered to repay to the 
plaintiff's parents $5,102.50, or any sum; and (3) that the 
defendant should have been awarded a larger lien against the 
property than the $13,500 decreed by the lower court. 
On appeal the plaintiff-respondent and cross-appellant 
seeks to have all of the aforesaid decisions affirmed as far as 
they go, and in addition asks the Supreme Court: (1) to reverse 
the lower court in awarding a lien of $13,500 to defendant and 
contends that no lien should have been awarded to defendant; 
and (2) asks this court to direct that the parties repay the 
loan from plaintiff's parents in the full amount of $13,205, 
(rather than just $10,205 as ordered by the Court) and asks that 
this sum be repaid from the fund of $97,320.22 (or in the alter-
native, that each of the parties pay one-half thereof, or $6,612.50 
each.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff takes issue with defendant's statement of 
facts as being incomplete, inadequate and in some respects totally 
in error. For example, defendant does not even refer therein to 
plaintiff's serious and prolonged medical problems, both physical 
and emotional. As to the effect of defendant's brain damage and 
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psychosis on the family (and its resulting stress upon the lives 
of the parties and the children) defendant devotes one sentence 
(see page 3 of defendant's brief): "Defendant experienced some 
difficulty performing household chores." 
We respectfully submit that it is necessary for the 
court to more fully understand the overwhelming problems this 
unfortunate couple has gone through and which they still face in 
order to reach a proper decision in this case. We will there-
fore attempt to set forth a more complete statement of facts, 
and we will attempt to note the errors contained in defendant's 
statement of facts in the areas to which they relate. 
DEFENDANT.' S HEAL.TH : 
In May 1973 the defendant was hospitalized, and while 
she was undergoing an operation, she suffered two massive cardiac 
arrests on May 3, 1973 (R298-299). Medical personnel were able 
to sustain her life, but she was left severely mentally impaired, 
and we will set forth a description of her condition as reported 
by various witnesses at the trial: 
Plaintiff: 
The plaintiff stated that when defendant was brought home 
after physically recovering from the aforesaid cardiac arrests, 
that she did not recognize her mother or her children (R303); that 
he brought home a totally different person, and that it took 
approximately two and one-half to three years before she could 
-6-
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speak full sentences (R303). From the time he broug4t her home 
until January or February 1974, she would mostly just sit and 
stare and was of no help in the home (R304). She had lost her 
former typing skills and was unable to carry on her former 
acti vi ties ( R3 0 5) . She could not cook or do household chores ( R3 O 4) • 
The plaintiff stated that in about January of 1974 
defendant exhibited psychotic behavior and was admitted to the 
University Hospital (R305) where she remained for about one 
month fulltime and approximately one month more parttime (R306-
307). The behavior that prompted this hospitalization was that 
the defendant tried to run away, tried to take off her clothes 
and run in the snow and attempted to meet with imaginary people, 
and to hide in the closet (R305) . Defendant did not appear to 
know who her children were and she would avoid them; for example, 
when they would come into the room, she would go into another 
room (R305). At that time she was treated by Dr. Paul Wender 
and was given substantial doses of medication (R306-307). Plain-
tiff elected to bring defendant home rather than to have her 
institutionalized (R306), but it was necessary to get a house-
keeper to care for the defenfant and the children. He obtained 
Elinor Cheever, a registered nurse and friend of the defendant, 
who came into the home to help and remained for approximately 
four years. Her expenses were paid by the LOS Church (R320-
321). With the help of Mrs. Cheever, the defendant learned to 
-7-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
do the washing, learned to do some mending and housecleaning 
and learned to assist with meals, learned to take care of her-
self personally in an improved way (R321) and also was able to 
assist in taking care of the children (R322) . 
During the summertime Mrs. Cheever remained in the 
home during the day and until the plaintiff returned from work. 
During the school months she came in the morning and helped with 
breakfast and then came again in the afternoon and stayed to 
assist with the evening meal (R322). 
The plaintiff stated that finally the defendant 
appeared to reach a plateau in her improvement (R360) and he 
thought defendant would need care from then on (R362) . She was 
admitted as a patient at the Plantation Nursing Home in August 
of 1978 (R365) , and she has improved in some areas while at the 
Plantation (R364). Defendant ia approximately 41 years old (Ex.6-P). 
Andrew Fisher, Psychiatrist: 
Dr. Andrew Fisher, a practicing psychiatrist, stated 
that he had treated the defendant since she entered the Plantation 
Nursing Home. His diagnosis was that she had organic brain damage 
due to cardiac arrest or pschosis, or both (R413,414). She came 
to the Plantation Nursing Home with a history of not having taken 
care of her children very well and not doing her day-to-day duties 
very well (R414). She became better in the nursing home, and her 
medication was eventually reduced from 400 mg. of Meloril to 300 
-8-
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mg. (R414-415). He advised that the improvement took place in 
the structured nursing home setting and cautioned that if much 
responsibility or much pressure were given to defendant, she 
might regress (R415). Defendant had difficulty when they 
attempted to reduce her medication (R416). 
Dr. Fisher stated that in his opinion she would never 
recover to the extent of her former abilities, but was making 
slow, but gradual progress in the nursing home situation, which 
(he noted) was less stressful than at home (R416,417). He 
thought it unlikely that she would ever be off her medications 
(R417) and that it was unlikely that she would ever be self-
sufficient (R415,419). At page 419 of the transcript, Dr. Fisher 
was asked, "Do you think it also totally unlikely that she will 
ever be able to function as a wife and mother of the family?", to 
which he replied, "I think she could possibly function as a wife, 
but I think she would have difficulty handling the responsibili-
ties of children." 
When asked whether he felt that the defendant would 
ever be able to handle the physical side of the marriage, he 
answered that that issue was speculative, but he thought that 
there would be problems (R419) . 
Elinor Cheever: 
Elinor Cheever, a registered nurse, stated that she was 
a very good and close friend of the defendant since before the 
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defendant's injuries (R440). She stated that after defendant's 
injuries, she was often in the home and determined that the defend· 
ant was unable to cook or keep house and stated that it was much 
like putting a child in charge of a home (R441) . She stated that 
the plaintiff tried to keep the family together (R442). For the 
last four years she had served in the home during the days and 
occasionally at nights and was still caring for the children at 
the time of trial. 
In her employment in the Izatt home, Mrs. Cheever said 
that she attempted to rehabilitate the defendant to a level that 
she could be a fulltime wife and mother (R442) and that she tried 
to be a model for the defendant in disciplining the children, in 
running the home and in purchasing for the home (R444). The 
defendant made some improvement and got so that she could pur-
chase items at the store (R445), but she was never able to drive. 
She was able to make her bed and wash clothes, but never did 
learn to iron or follow recipes, nor to do much cooking (R445). 
Mrs. Cheever's work with the defendant was the most "difficult 
responsibility" in her entire life (R446). The defendant had 
difficulty expressing love for the children (R446) and defend-
ant's discipline was not appropriate and it lacked consistency 
(R446,447). Mrs. Cheever said at R446: "It was not uncommon 
really to see her snatch a handful of hair out of Camille's hair, 
and she was a little girl without a whole lot of hair. And I 
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recall saying to Mary, 'There are better ways to discipline~"c 
She stated that the children had difficulty with defendant's 
discipline and they appeared to interpret her behavior as 
showing favoritism (R460). The defendant was able to show 
little affection for the children (R462). Over the years she 
has improved somewhat (R462) and particularly defendant could 
enjoy humor again and seemed to enjoy life more; she also improved 
socially somewhat and became more pleasant (R461) . 
Dr. Paul Wender, Psychiatrist: 
Dr. Paul Wender, a professor of psychiatry at the Univer-
sity of Utah, testified that he cared for the defendant from the 
time she was hospitalized at University Ho~pital in January 1974 
(she was hospitalized for approximately six week~) until approxi-
mately July 1978 (R449,450,452). 
Dr. Wender's diagnosis was that the defendant suffered 
from a significant degree of brain damage and extensive psychosis 
(R450). He stated that medication helped the psychosis, but the 
brain damage was not helped thereby. Defendant continued to suffer 
impaired memory, impaired social judgment, impaired recall of 
emotional responsibilities to her husband and to her children, all 
of which the doctor stated indicated brain damage (R450,451). 
He further stated that the prolonged use of defendant's 
medication can cause brain damage in itself, so he tried to reduce 
the dosage, but when he got below a certain minimum "psychotic 
-11-
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halucinations would occur, halucinatory and auditory, and she 
would display a bad social judgment, such as a psychotic basis of 
hearsay injuries, the kids, physically going after them with a 
baseball bat, or things like that . . . " (R451) . 
Dr. Wender finally got her to a level of between 300 
and 400 mg. of meloril per day (R452), and although there had 
been measurable improvement, it was not substantial (R453). He 
stated that in brain damage cases; it is not likely that much 
improvement occurs after two years (R453) although some improve-
ment may continue in the area of her psychosis after two years 
(R458). Dr. Wender's conclusion at page 454 of the record (when 
asked whether or not defendant would ever be able to function in 
a normal capacity as a housewife) was as follows: 11 my 
opinion is that she will never be able to function in that capac-
ity." When asked, "Do you think that s.he will have the ability to 
care for the children?" he answered, n The probability, exceedingly 
nil." (R454). 
Dr. Wender recommended institutionalizing defendant, but 
realized that it was hard for plaintiff to accept that alternative 
at first, and he had therefore had to present that matter of insti· 
tutionalization of defendant to the plaintiff in a gradual way 
(R454-456). Dr. Wender brought in Dr. Lynn Clark as a consultant 
(who had much experience with brain damage cases) and Dr. Clark 
concluded that defendant suffered from loss of spontaneity, loss 
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of emotional expression towards plaintiff and the children and 
bad social judgment, and concluded that she was suffering from 
brain damage (R453,454). 
Kenneth Clark, Defendant's Uncle and Guardian: 
Kenneth Clark stated that defendant had made some 
improvement while at the Planation Nursing Horne (R470). 
Christine Miller Ferguson: 
Mrs. Ferguson, a social worker at the Plantation Nursing. 
Horne (R481) , testified that the plaintiff had stated that he wante< 
to institutionalize defendant because she was being disruptive at 
home (R483). Plaintiff told her that he did not want to upset the 
defendant by letting her know that she was going to be institution· 
alized permanently at the time she was first brought to the Planta· 
tion, and she also stated that the plaintiff had told her that he 
was not going to divorce defendant when she was institutionalized 
in August 1978 (R484). Mrs. Ferguson apparently took issue with 
plaintiff's not being more frank with the defendant about her 
admission at the Plantation. In this connection she was asked at 
page 501 of the record: "And whether the means of getting her 
admitted you thought peculiar or not, you don't and did not then 
and don't now quarrel with the fact that was an appropriate step 
to take, do you?", to which she replied at page 502, "No." She 
stated that the plaintiff was very upset and under much stress 
when the defendant was admitted (RSOO). Mrse Ferguson stated 
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that the defendant had made considerable improvement while at 
the Plantation Nursing Home, that they had been able to reduce 
her medication from 400 to 300 mg. of Meloril (R485). The 
defendant was employed in a program at the nursing home where 
she assisted in the laundry and also worked at an inquiry center 
in a job similar to a librarian and had done some staff baby 
sitting (R485,486). Present plans for defendant called for her 
to begin secretarial training at Trade Tech in September 1979 
(R486); that although her skill levels were low, the defendant 
was making progress in her typing skills, working on her memory 
and her budgeting skills and stated that her memory had improved 
and her grooming practices and sociability has improved (R486). 
Mrs. Ferguson did not recommend that the defendant leave 
the nursing home as of that time (R487) and in fact statedatR487 
that she didn't think that she would ever be able to leave the 
nursing home, but felt that she could be trained to become "capable 
of earning a livelihood " (R487), but stated that there was some 
question about her earning ability (R487). 
PLAINTIFF'S HEALTH: 
Plaintiff: 
Plaintiff testified that he had been hospitalized in 
1974, 1975 and 1979 with ulcer and stomach problems (R327), and 
that tension, worry and concern had led to removal of his stomach. 
(R327) 
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David L. Egli, M.D.: 
Dr. David L. Egli, a psychiatrist, testified that he 
first saw plaintiff when plaintiff was hospitalized for gastric 
problems in April 1979. Plainttff was suffering from depression 
and Dr. Egli administered anti-depressant medication. Shortly 
thereafter, due to an adverse reaction to this medication, he 
had to hospitalize the plaintiff (R344,345l. Dr. Egli diagnosed 
plaintiff's condition as reactive depression. Plaintiff probably 
had a tendency for deprsssion, he said, but his condition was 
caused "especially by stress situations that he had undergone in 
the past few years." (R346). 
Dr. Egli further stated that these stresses not only 
cause depression and the nervous condition which he observed in 
plaintiff, but also likely manifested themselves in plaintiffis 
physical ailments as well (R346). Dr. Egli felt that the granting 
of a divorce in this case would probably result in an improvement 
of plaintiff's depression and anxiety (R347), and he stated that 
plaintiff suffered from ari "ongoing condition characterized by a 
sense of inadequacy, depression, helplessness, so forth," (R349) 
and he felt that six months' psychiatric treatment would be neces-
sary to overcome this problem (R347,349). Dr. Egli stated that 
he did not see evidence of the existence of these conditions prior 
to defendant's illness, except that he felt that plaintiff might 
have a "tendency" for such problems (R350). Dr. Egli had recom-
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mended family therapy for the children at the LDS Hospital Out-
patient Psychiatric Department (R348). 
Ralph L. Tingey, M.D., Internist: 
Dr. Ralph E. Tingey, a specialist in internal medicine, 
(R352) stated that he had treated plaintiff for approximately five 
-and o~e-half years (R352) and had hospitalized plaintiff for duo-
denopeptic ulcer in 1974 (R353). Dr. Tingey had hospitalized the 
plaintiff in 1975 for abdominal pain and had determined at that 
time that the pain was not organic in nature, but rather "psycho-
physiologica~" in nature and had referred plaintiff to psychia.;.. 
trist, Robert Burgoyne (R354). Dr. Tingey also saw plaintiff in 
1979 as a consultant to Dr.· McAllister, a surgeon. Plaintiff was 
then complaining of abdominal pain (R354) and it was determined 
at that time that plaintiff had "functional bowel obstruction due 
to emotional psychological problems causing the pain." (R355). Dr. 
Tingey further stated that he had seen plaintiff from August 1975 
to April 1979 (other than in connection with said hospitalizations) 
for "abdominal pain, diarrhea and functional bowel complaints." 
(R355). Dr. Tingey stated that plaintiff had had most of his 
stomach removed in 1974 by Dr. McAllister because of duodenal 
ulcer. Dr. Tingey felt that the operation cured the ulcer per 
se, but stated that the plaintiff has had ulcer syndrome since 
that time, particularly what he described as a "dumping syndrome'~ 
(R356) and he stated that dumping syndrome meant: " . . . because 
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of the rerouting of the food stream in the intestinal tract, 
food would dump quickly from his stomach into the intestinal 
tract. This is quite common, and this disturbed him for a long 
while and caused diarrhea. And this is always made more severe 
by emotional distrubance." Dr. Tingey said the majority of the 
plaintiff's symptoms had been due to emotional stress resulting 
from the defendant's condition, and in his opinion the divorce 
would help his condition. Dr .. Tingey was asked on cross-exami-
nation (on the subject of the stresses on plaintiff): "If his 
wife's illness is one of those causes and the divorce is granted 
and he is no longer married to her, well, that will relieve some 
of the stress, I suppose?", to which Dr. Tingey stated: "I think 
that is right." (R358). Dr. Tingey said plaintiff's recovery 
will be gradua~ (R358) and he felt that plaintiff "probably will 
always need some medical attention and care, although certainly 
years of age (Ex.6-P) 
not the kind he is requiring now.!' (R3.57) Plaintiff is approx. 40/ 
DEBT OWED PLAINTIFF'S PARENTS: 
Plaintiff's father, Wilford Izatt, and his wife, Wilma, 
had spent considerable time in the Izatt home after defendant's 
operation and they advanced considerable sums of money to plain-
tiff and defendant: 
Plaintiff: 
Plaintiff testified that his parents had resided in 
the home of the parties for approximately one and one-half years 
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after defendant's accident (R304). They would come on Monday 
and remain until Friday or Saturday and sometimes would stay all 
week (R304). 
Plaintiff had to obtain money from his parents to pay 
bills and obligations which arose because of defendant's condi-
tion (R312) or to pay living expenses which he was unable to pay 
because his money was otherwise committed because of defendant's 
illness (R313) . Exhibit P-1 consisting of checks evidencing 
moneys received by plaintiff from his parents was introduced and 
received by the Court as showing support received by the family 
from plaintiff's parents in the sum of approximately $5,105.00, 
though the Court noted that this money was not necessarily 
received by defendant individually (R314). Plaintiff stated that 
he was unable on his income to pay all his medical bills and other 
expenses and was required to go to the church and to his parents 
for assistance (R315), and he stated that his financial circum-
stances in this connection were aggravated by the expenses of his 
own medical problems (R316). Plaintiff testified that his parents 
made clothing for the children (R316) and bought groceries fort~ 
family during the period they resided in the home (R308) . During 
the 18 months they resided in the home, they purchased virtually 
all of the groceries (R317,319), bought some of the groceries for 
the next four to five years (R319) and were still bringing gro-
ceries at the time of trial (R316). Plaintiff has not been able 
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to repay his parents any of the foregoing (R33St. 
Wilford Izatt, Plaintiff's Father: 
Wilford Izatt, plaintif~'s father, confirmed that he 
and his wife stayed with the Izatts for approximately 18 months 
after defendant's injury (R400), and he stated that after the 
first 18 months plaintiff's parents had spent other frequent 
periods in the Izatt home and estimated since May 3, 1973, he 
and his wife had spent approximately six months in the Izatt 
home aside from the initial 18 months (R402) for a total of 
approximately 24 months since defendant's accident (R402). 
Plaintiff's father stated that he and his wife had_paid for 
the groceries during the initial 18-month period after defend-
ant's injuries and that the cost thereof was between $200 and 
$250 per month (R401), and during the additional six-month period 
of their stay in the Izatt home they had spent approximately $50 
to $75 per month on groceries (R401,403). Plaintiff's father 
stated that the money was furnished to plaintiff upon the under-
standing that plaintiff would repay it when he could (R405). 
There had been numerous small amounts under $20 or $25 which were 
paid to plaintiff in cash and for which no record had been made 
(R406). Plaintiff's father stated that he worked in the home of 
the Izatts painting, papering and doing general upkeep since the 
defendant's illness (R406) and stated that he had painted rooms 
in the house and had painted the outside of the house (R407) and 
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that plaintiff had told him that the parents would be repaid 
when plaintiff had the money to do it (R407). He stated that he 
and the plaintiff reached an agreement with regard to the reim-
bursement to be made by virtue of the painting, to-wit, the sum 
of $1,500 (R410). Plaintiff's father also insulated the house 
and put sheet rock in the basement (R429) , but no: special dis-
cussion of repayment of these items was ever had (R430). Shortly 
before Mary's illness he had loaned plaintiff $3,000 for dental 
expenses (R430,431,434). 
The Court stated that with respect to the loans of the 
plaintiff's father to plaintiff, he was admitting tnat testimony 
on the basis that the money went for family expenses of plaintiff, 
defendant and the children, although the testimony indicated that 
the agreements to repay were between plaintiff and his father 
only (R437,438) 
While in the home, in addition to caring for defendant 
and the children, plaintiff's parents did the cooking and laundry 
and assisted in general housekeeping (R400) . 
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE: 
Plaintiff's grounds for divorce in this case were the 
defendant's lack of affection for him and the children and the 
defendant's erratic behavior, causing such emotional and physical 
stress that he could no longer continue in the marriage. One 
aspect of this stress was stress brought on by the deteriorating 
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condition of the children because of their mother's condition. 
Counsel for plaintiff started to get into this matter as it 
related to grounds (R324). Plaintiff testified at R324 that the 
children had been cared for by a number of different people to the 
point where they were becoming very confused as to what was going 
on in their lives and where they fit into the scheme of things. 
Counsel for defendant objected to such testimony, stating that 
it "doesn't help or do any good." (R324). The Court thereupon 
stated at page 325 of the record: "I think there has been suf-
ficient grounds put in." In view of that statement by the Court, 
plaintiff did not develop the matter of grounds further as it did 
not appear to be necessary and might indeed be disruptive and pro-
duce no worthwhile benefit, particularly in view of the fact that 
the defendant was present throughout the proceedings. (R262) 
It should be noted that defendant's lack of affection 
for plaintiff, both emotional and physical, is noted numerous times 
by other witnesses as set forth in connection with the section on 
Defendant's Health (see pages 6 to 14 of this Statement of Facts.) 
The defendant stated, when called as a witness, that 
she did not desire to contradict or add to that which had been 
stated at the trial (RSOS). On the question of grounds she 
stated that she wanted the divorce because the plaintiff "took 
me away from my children." (R506). She did admit that she sees 
the children on weekends when plaintiff brings them out and that 
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she had indeed seen the children on the last three weekends prior 
to trial (RSOS,508). Defendant stated that before the divorce 
plaintiff had shown affection for her (R506). 
Defendant further stated that she did not object to 
plaintiff's having temporary custody of the children (R507). She 
stated that she knew that she had incurred attorney's fees and 
wanted·an award of attorney's fees (R507); she wanted the child-
ren when she was well enough (R507); she wanted alimony (R507); 
she wanted certain enumerated books and pictures (R507); and she 
wanted plaintiff to pay the debts of the marriage (R508) . She 
stated that she wanted plaintiff to keep up the insurance (R508}. 
At the conclusion of the trial it was decided that each 
of the parties would submit a memorandum in lieu of oral argument 
and in connection with that discussion, counsel for plaintiff 
stated at R420 that: "My inclination would be to request that the 
Court grant a divorce today and in effect keep under reservation 
those items that are disputed for future resolution, and then in 
effect we can start reconstructing their lives, and we would ask, 
as we have asked in our proposal that the court make it effective 
today, or upon entry rather than upon any waiting period, and, 
therefore, may expedite getting their lives reconstructed." 
Defendant's counsel stated thereupon at page 521 of the 
record: "Your Honor can grant it now or else at the end of the 
interlocutory period. It appears that a divorce is going to have 
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to be granted. I,have no objection to granting it now. I think 
there is a big question on the distribution of assets . " 
(Emphasis added.) He also stated at page 521 of the record: "She 
does ask for a divorce. I guess he asks for it, so, I guess, you 
are going to have to make up your mind about which one it is to 
be g;anted to." The Court then stated: "My question is whether 
it is her desire, whether it be final upon entry or final in three 
months?" Mr.· Hanson stated: "It doesn't matter to her, your Ho.nor." 
The Court then stated at page 521 of the record: "The 
Court does find that in this matter the plaintiff, Joel H. Izatt, 
and the defendant, Mary c. Izatt, have both petitioned the court 
for divorce, and the court grants the divorce to Joel H. Izatt 
and also Mary c. Izatt jointly, and that the divorce should 
become final upon entry." Whereupon Mr. Hanson stated: "Upon 
what grounds, your Honor?" and the Court stated: "Upon the 
grounds of mental cruelty." 
PLAINTIFF'S INCOME: 
Plaintiff is employed at Evans Advertising and has a 
gross income of $1,700 per month (R333). Plaintiff's takehome 
pay is $608.48 two times per month for a total of $1,216.96 per 
month (R333), not $1,300 per month net as stated at page 4 of 
appellant's brief. None of the children of the parties are 
employed (R377) . 
In addition, at the time of trial the parties were 
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receiving assistance from the LDS.Church. Until August 1978, 
this consisted of the church paying for the services of Elinor 
Cheever to work in the home at a cost of $4.70 per hour (R443) 
and amounted to the total sum of approximately $22,698.89 (R463), 
At the time of trial the church was paying for defend-
ant's care in the nursing home in the sum of approximately $1,125 
per month (R487). Plaintiff's financial needs on a monthly basis 
as set forth on Exhibit 5-P are as follows: 
Description Amount per Month 
House payment (includes 
prepaid taxes) 
Maintenance (residence) 
Food and household supplies 
Utilities (including water, 
electricity, gas & heat) 
Telephone 
Laundry and dry cleaning 
Clothing 
Medical and dental for children 
(not covered by insurance) 
Medical and dental for husband 
(not covered by insurance) 
School 
Recreation (Deseret Gymn $28.48, 
ski passes for children $65 for 
about 4 months= $21. 67 monthly) 
Incidentals (grooming, gifts, 
tithing, donations, etc.) 
Transportation (other than auto) 
Au~o expenses (gas, oil repair, 
insurance) 
Auto payment 
Piano lessons 
First Security Visa 
Mastercharge (Tnacy-Collins) 
ZCMI 
Total 
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$223.00 
35.00 
360.00 
114.00 
23.00 
10.00 
80.00 
140.00 
220.00 
48.00 
50.15 
169.00 
5.00 
50.00 
148.00 
40.00 
25.00 
25.00 
55.19 
$1,820.34 
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The foregoing itemization does not include any amount 
needed to repay plaintiff's parents nor to repay the church. In 
. 
regard to the indebtedness to the church, plaintiff stated that he 
had agreed to repay the church for its assistance rendered by reason 
of defendant's problems, and that he felt obligated to do so. (R37l, 
373, 379). The church paid Mrs. Cheever alone approximately the 
sum of $22,698.89 (R463) and other expenses of approximately $8,300 
for a total of approximately $32,400. (Exhibit 12-P) . 
ASSETS: 
For the convenience of the court we set out an itemization 
showing on the left a list of the assets as established at the trial. 
The middle column indicates those assets received by plaintiff, and 
the right hand column those assets received by defendant. (Values 
used are those found by the Court and were not contested except as 
to the debt to plaintiff's parents and debt to the LDS Church.) 
Assets 
House 474 K Street 
$70,000 less $16,000 
mortgage, $54,000 equity 
( R3 3 2 I 3 3 3 ) ( 11-D ' 12 - p ) 
Cash value of life 
insurance ($10,064 total) 
(R464) ) 11-D I 12-P) 
Furniture 
( R3 4 2 ) ( 11-D , 12 - P ) 
Vested Profit-sharing 
(R464) (8-D,12-P) 
Stock plan 
(R464) (9-D, 12-P) 
Plaintiff Defendant 
$40,500.00 $13,500.00 
5,032.00 5,032.00 
3,000.00 
124c57 
108.78 
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Plymouth van 
( R3 6 8 ) ( 11-D I 12 - p) 
Savings account 
(R463,464) (11-D, 12-P} 
Checking account 
(R463,464) (11-D, 12-P) 
Cash proceeds from 
malpractice suit 
(R222,476 
Jewelry 
(12-P, 11-D) 
Debts - general 
( R5 l 9 ) ( 12 - P ) 
Debt to parents 
$10 I 2 0 5 ( R2 2 4 ) 
(Plaintiff contends 
this figure should be 
at least $13,500 (12-P) 
Debt to LDS Church 
$32,400) (12-P) 
Totals 
Percentage of 
total net assets 
Notes: 
6,000.00 
488.76 
200.00 
[7,310.451 
(see Note 1) 
[5,102.50] 
No disposition 
$43' 041.16 
27.28% 
97,320.22 
4,000.00 
[5,102.50] 
No disposition 
$114,749.72 
72.72% 
1. The aforesaid general debts consisted of a First Security 
Visa - $492; Mastercharge - $256.52; ZCMI - $551.93; and $6,000 
owing on the Plymouth van. 
2. In addition, each of the parties was awarded his (her) per-
sonal effects. 
3. $ 43,041.16 
114,749.72 
$157,790.88 Total net assets. 
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INTEREST: 
Pursuant to a hearing on defendant's Motion for 
Authorization to Withdraw Funds from the said sum of $ 97, 3 20.22, 
the Court ordered that $15,000 of said sum be released to the 
defendant forthwith and that the balance be invested at interest 
pendfuq·disposi tion of this appeal (R4 34, 43 5) . The said sum has 
been invested at 11.892% per annum interest at United Savings, 
and interest is accruing and will amount to $4,894 by October 24, 
1980, and this is an asset available for distribution as may be 
directed by this court. 
At the time of the hearing of said motion, the defendant 
represented, and in her written Memorandum also represented (R531), 
that the defendant was then attending trade school and earning a 
munimum wage under a federally-funded education program. 
MEDICAL EXPENSES: 
In her Statement of Facts defendant asserts that Exhibit 
13-D indicates no payments for medical expenses or other expenses 
relating to defendant's illness (See page 6 of appellant's brief). 
It should be noted that Exhibit 13-D was not introduced at the 
trial, but rather was introduced by stipulation after the trial (Rl02). 
A number of the checks in Exhibit 13-D are medical in nature, but 
plaintiff was never asked to explain them. Many of the checks were 
to banks, presumably for loans or advances, and plaintiff was :_not 
asked to what extent those loans or advances were for medical 
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expenses. It should further be noted that the checks in Exhibit 
13-D are only for the year 1979 (and a few for December 1978) and 
so are very limited in scope. Exhibit 13~D is no basis for the 
defendant's assertion that plaintiff had no medical expenses or 
other expenses because of defendant's illness. It is true that 
plaintiff was asked at the first hearing concerning defendnt's 
medical expenses, but it should be noted that he was asked no 
further questions concerning that subject at the second hearing. 
All documents requested of plaintiff's counsel by defendant were 
furnished (R396). We submit that it is safe to assume the Eugene 
Hansen, counsel for both parties in the malpractice action, had 
the most complete list of medical expenses incurred by reason of 
the defendant's injuries, and those records were as easily access-
ible to the defendant as to the plaintiff. 
-28-
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ARGUMENT 
Under familiar principles this court can review both 
facts and law in divorce cases, although the court will of course 
give due allowance for the advantaged position of the trial judge. 
Wiese v. Wiese, 24 Ut 2d 236, 469 P2d 504(1970). 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF 
A DIVORCE FROM THE DEFENDANT. 
The thrust of defendant's argument under her Point I 
concerning the awarding of the divorce to the plaintiff (as well 
as to defendant) seems to be that defendant was not responsible 
for her conduct because of her mental condition. We believe that 
defendant's position in this regard is an extreme oversimplifica-
tion of a very complex problem. 
To begin with, it appears clear to everyone that a 
divorce was necessary in this case. Even defendant's counsel at 
the conclusion of the trial stated: "It appears that a divorce is 
going to have to be granted." (R521). It is true that the parties 
had an ideal marriage prior to the defendant's operation on May 3, 
1973. It is likewise uncontroverted that plaintiff, from May 3, 
1973, until he filed this divorce action in December 1979 (and 
even thereafter as far as that goes) had treated defendant with 
extreme kindness, care and consideration. He has nursed her, 
cared for her, assisted her in every way possible. Elinor Cheever, 
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the registered nurse who took care of the family for over four 
years, stated that it was amply clear that plaintiff did every-
thing he could to keep the family together (R442) . She stated 
at page 460 of the record that plaintiff treated defendant very 
kindly and did all that he could and left no stone unturned. She 
stated: "He treated her, every time I was there, he always treated 
her with loving, kind words and he made very opportunity to take 
her and entertain her as much as she could be entertained, and I 
think he did a princely job." 
The strain of the situation created by defendant's con-
dition made it necessary after approximately six years for plain-
tiff to make a decision for the sake of his own health and for 
the sake of the children whose lives were being disrupted. Dr. 
Wender and others had told him that the defendant would have to 
be institutionalized and he resisted this as long as he possibly 
could. He finally realized that it was necessary, and in August 
1978 had defendant institutionalized. At that time he had no 
intention of seeking a divorce as the uncontroverted testimony 
discloses. By December 1979 the plaintiff had concluded that it 
would be advisable to obtain a divorce so that he could get 
remarried and bring a woman into the home to help care for the 
children. 
Prior to entry of the Supplemental Decree, plaintiff 
did in fact marry Mary Ellen Fifield (This fact is not in the 
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evidence as such, but is noted in defendant's brief (page 18) and 
is not in dispute.) This remarriage did not thus grow out of 
improper conduct of the'plaintiff, nor is that claimed. When 
advised of the remarriage, counsel for the defendant said: "As 
far as we are concerned, I appreciate that problem and I am not in any 
way criticising Mr. Izatt for getting married so fast here on this 
thing. The children have got to have a home. That is the reali-
ties of this situation." (R282). Defendant's counsel thereupon 
expressed a willingness on the behalf of the defendant that the 
home not be sold by reason of said remarriage. 
The testimony was uncontroverted that the defendant 
could not take care of the children and in all likelihood never 
would be able to do so. If plaintiff permitted the severe stresses 
to continue on him, chances were extremely good that his own heal th 
would break down, and upon his demise (or becoming incapacitated), 
the children of necessity would be left without parents because 
defendant would not be able to take care of them. 
Thus, although the defendant postponed the inevitable, 
he finally yielded to the overwhelming demands of the situation 
and obtained a divorce. 
When asked what her grounds were against plaintiff, the 
defendant stated that he "took me away from my children." (R506). 
That appears to be the sole grounds which she asserts against the 
plaintiff. Notwithstanding that assertion, the testimony was 
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uncontrovered that defendant was given liberal visitation, and also 
uncontroverted that placing defendant in a nursing home was 
essential, necessary and appropriate (RSOl,502). 
Although the evidence discloses that the defendant had 
brain damage and psychosis, it also disclosed that the psychosis 
was confrolled to a considerable extent by medication. Thus, ev~ 
though defendant had severe impairment, she was by no means a vege 
table and certainly had a significant degree of free agency in the 
carrying out of her life and in her conduct. Defendant's counsel 
chose to have defendant sit throughout the entire trial, presum-
ably because she did have capacity to appreciate what was going 
on and to particpate in the proceedings. Defendant testified. 
In having defendant testify, it seems to us that defendant's coun· 
sel represents that she has sufficient competency to assist the 
court by her testimony. Certainly, in placing her on the stand, 
her counsel represents to the court that she knows the difference 
between right and wrong as she was sworn to tell the truth. She 
testified in an intelligible manner, and she appeared to perceive 
and understand what she was talking about. She testified about 
the property that she desired to have awarded to her, the fact 
that she wanted attorney's fees awarded to her, the fact that she 
was willing to let plaintiff have temporary custody of the child-
ren, but that she desired custody ultimately, and that she desir~ 
that plaintiff pay the bills of the marriage and keep up theinsur 
ance. It therefore appears clear that the Court was justified in 
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determining that defendant had a significant measure of self-
control, was not without free choice in her actions, and that 
some measure of culpability was inherent in her lack of affection 
for the plaintiff and in her lack of responsiveness and affection 
for the children and in her erratic behavior. 
Therefore, upon consideration of the foregoing principles, 
it appears clear that (1) a divorce was necessary, and (2) thatthe 
plaintiff was no more culpable in this unfortunate case than was 
the defendant, and even if the Court should conclude that the cul-
pability of one or both of the parties is slight in this instance, 
still the best interests of the parties and of the children will 
not be ~erved in failing to award a divorce, and we feel that the 
Court exhibited considerable wisdom in its decision to award a 
divorce to both parties. 
Where fault is substantially equal between the parties 
to a divorce proceeding, this court held in Mullins v. Mullins, 
26 Ut 2d 82, 485 P2d 663 (1971), that it was proper to award a 
divorce to both parties. We believe that this is such a case 
and that the decision in Mullins should be followed in this case. 
(If defendant were totally lacking in mental capacity, Section 
30-3-1, UCA, 1953, would perhaps more clearly apply. Where, as 
here, defendant is severely lacking in some areas, but better in 
others, its applicability becomes more tenuous. That section pur-
ports to require two separate proceedings, one conditioned upon 
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the other, which appears to serve no useful purposes in a case 
such as this one. It is perhaps regrettable that Section 30-3-1 
has not been drafted somewhat more realistically as it might 
indeed minimize the trauma in cases such as the instant one.) 
Johnson v. Johnson, 107 Ut 147, 152 P2d 426 (1941), 
cited by defendant, does not support her position. It holds that 
a physical condition alone is not grounds for divorce, but that the 
conduct of one having that condition can be, and indeed was in that 
case·. It is ~efendant's conduct that gives plaintiff grounds in 
the instant case. 
Finally, more evidence of grounds could and would have 
been introduced but for the trial court's statement that he was 
satisfied on the matter of grounds (R325,262). 
POINT II. PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED THE ENTIRE EQUITY 
IN THE HOME. 
In this Point we desire to respond to the contention ~ 
defendant in her Point III that the lien awarded to her shouldh~ 
been in excess of $13,500, and in addition deal with plaintiff's posi· 
ti on on the cross-appeal that no lien should have been awarded to the 
defendant. Defendant appears to take the position that the house 
should be equally divided between the parties and she further con· 
tends that at the same time defendant should receive all the money 
from the malpractice action. As we noted in the Statement of Fact 
at page 26 of this brief, distribution as between the parties asit 
now stands awards to defendant 72.72% of the total assets of the 
parties and awards to plaintiff only 27.28% of the total assetsof 
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theparties. If defendant is awarded an additional $13,500 as a 
lien against the home (making her total lien $27,000), defendant 
will have been awarded ·81.28% of the total assets and plaintiff 
will have been awarded only 18.72% of the total assets of the 
marriage. Perhaps no further argument is necessary to demon-
strate the inequity of that proposal. 
Nevertheless, we believe the following should be noted: 
Defendant has clearly lost sight of the fact that plaintiff, with 
severely impaired health, now has the obligation to raise the four 
children of the parties. He has only modest income (he testified 
that he has approx. $1,216 per month net takehome pay and that his 
monthly needs were in excess of $1,800 per month.) The inexcapable 
conclusion is that it is going to be next to impossible for plain-
tiff to ever raise sufficient funds to pay out any lien on the home. 
The primary concern in this case s.hould be the welfare 
of the children. They need to know that they have a secure home, 
one from which they will not be uprooted. An important factor in 
their happiness is the knowledge that their father will not be 
facing difficulties which he cannot handle and that his health 
will not be further impaired, to the end that they may in effect 
be orphaned before reaching the age of majority. Plaintiff real-
istically is the only parent who will ever be able to raise the 
children. If the burdens placed upon him are such that he cannot 
handle them and he breaks down physically or mentally, the child-
ren will indeed suffer, and they should be the primary concern 
at this time. 
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The defendant apparently takes the position that all 
of the money from the malpractice action is clearly that of the 
defendant, to which the plaintiff has no claim or right whatso-
ever. We do not quarrel with the fact that the defendant has 
been severely injured. We do however think it equally important 
to note that plaintiff's life has likewise been severely damaged 
by this incident, his heal th severely impaired, and in a very real 
sense, his life left in a shambles. Furthermore, it is the plai~ 
tiff who has borne the burden of pursuing the malpractice action, 
of assembling data and dealing with the lawyers over the six years 
or so in which that action was pending. It should also be noted 
that the plaintiff was one of the parties to that action and cer-
tainly has a claim upon those proceeds. We are not asking fora~ 
of that money to be awarded to the plaintiff, but rather that the 
equity in the home be awarded to him, the proceeds from the mal-
practice action awarded to the defendant (after payment of the 
indebtedness to plaintiff's parents), and each party enabled then 
to rebuild his or her life as best the circumstances permit. 
It should be further noted that the Court has wisely 
reserved the issue of alimony. It is clear that with the large 
settlement which she now has, the defendant has no need of alimony 
at the present time (and alimony is not an issue in this action). 
If at a later time the defendant should require alimony, however, 
the plaintiff will still have to assume that obligation to the 
extent a court may later determine it is appropriate. If the 
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defendant uses up the proceeds of the malpractice action and needs 
further money, the plaintiff can be called upon to the extent of 
his then ability in the light of his healthandother circumstances 
to pay support. (And of course defendant will presumably also be 
eligible for church assistance and/or Medicaid.) 
To award a $27,000 lien to the defendant in addition to 
the sum of $97,320.22 is simply not warranted by the facts of this 
case. 
It is true that the Court has placed some conditions upon 
the payment of the lien which tend to mitigate the harshness of the 
award. But those limitations effectively preclude the family from 
ever making a change in their place of residence. If plaintiff 
can improve himself in his employment by a move of any kind, he 
will be effectively precluded from doing it because as soon as he 
moves out of the house or sells it, he must pay the lien to the 
defendant and he has no funds with which to do so. We acknowledge 
that the terms such as those imposed by the Court are frequently 
employed and often produce an equitable result, but it should be 
noted that normally those restrictions are placed upon the wife's 
use of the home as it is usually the wife who is awarded the home 
in which to raise the children. More often, if the wife moves 
from the home or ceases to use it as a residence, it is because 
she has remarried and her new husband has assumed financial obli-
gations for her. In the instant case, however, those circumstances 
do not exist. Plaintiff is the breadwinner and has the obligation 
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to go where his work requires him to go. 
If the court is inclined to feel that a lien is proper 
in this case, we urge the court not to increase it in any way. A 
lien of $13,500 is more than ample and is more than the plaintiff 
will in all likelihood ever be able to pay. To double that lien 
as the defendant seeks is, we believe, unfair and unnecesary to 
the welfare of the defendant. 
The defendant has apparently attempted to make an issue 
out of the fact that no interest is being paid to the defendant 
on the money under the Court' s order, arid we acknowledge that that 
is so, but think it should be noted that the plaintiff is carryi~ 
out the difficult task of attempting to rear four children who 
have been through six extremely traumatic years, and although he 
is living in the home without paying any interest or rent to the 
defendant, he is nonetheless to the very best of his ability 
attempting to provide the children with the necessities of life, 
and to the extent that he is able, the extras such as music les-
sons, and to deprive the children of money which they presently 
need in order to build a large fund for the defendant is, we 
believe, wholly unjustified. 
Pursuant to the Court's order of March 26, 1980, the 
parties have invested $82,320.22 ($97,320.22 less $15,000 which 
was withdrawn by defendant pursuant to said court order) in a 
six month money market certificate at United Savings & Loan 
Association. This money was invested on April 24, 1980, bears 
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an in~erest rate of 11.892% per annum and will thus earn interest 
as of October 24, 1980, in the sum of $4,894, which sum is avail-
able for disposition by this court, or as it may direct. (R534, 
53 5) • 
POINT III. THE AWARD OF $10,205 TO THE PLAINTIFF'S PARENTS WAS 
PROPER AS FAR AS IT GOES, BUT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN REPAID IN FULL 
($13,205) FROM THE $97,320.22 FUND. 
We think that from the evidence there can be no doubt 
that the plaintiff's parents loaned to the parties at least the 
sum of $13,205 during the approximately six years prior to trial. 
Exhibit 1-P shows checks paid by the plaintiff's parents to the 
plaintiff in the sum of $5, 105. Even if checks number 4141 and 
4303 are excluded because one of them has the work "gift" written 
on it and the other one has the word "xmas" written on it, it 
leaves a sum of $4,805. In addition the plaintiff's parents 
advanced $1,500 for painting and repairs to the home and loaned 
plaintiff $3,000 for dental work. Groceries were provided for 
18 months at a figure of at least $200 per month for a total of 
$3,600, and in additional groceries were provided for another six 
months at a minimum figure of $50 per month for a total of $300, 
making a total of $13,205. Of this the Court allowed $10,205, 
and presumably therefore did not allow the $3,000 for dental 
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work. We believe that that omission was unjustified and that the 
full amount of $13,205 should be allowed. 
The only evidence before the Court was that those moneys 
were to be paid by plaintiff to his parents as soon as he was able 
Certainly as to the moneys loaned after defendant's accident, it 
was clear from the evidence that the plaintiff would not be able 
to repay those sums except from the settlement of the lawsuit in 
which both plaintiff and defendant were joint plaintiffs. It seems 
clear that defendant's accident likewise made it impossible to 
sooner repay the $3,000 dental loan until such time as the settl~ 
ment was achieved because additional expenses to the family created 
too much of a burden on plaintiff. 
The trial court found that although the transaction was
1 
negotiated between the plaintiff and the plaintiff's father, that 
the plaintiff, defendant and the children were the beneficiaries 
of those sums, and there is no evidence to the contrary. It 
therefore seems inexcapable that equity requires that that sum 
be repaid. We believe that it should be paid from the personal 
injury settlement, but at the very least, the order of the Court 
ordering that each of the parties assume one-half of that obli-
gation should not be disturbed by this court. 
The defendant asserts four reasons why she ·feels that 
she should not be required to participate in that obligation. We 
would like to treat each one briefly: 
1. As stated at page 9 of defendant's brief, the first 
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reason is that " ... the liability, is supported at best by 
a moral obligation to repay which is not consideration for an 
obligation." 
We desire to point out that even if it were only a moral 
obligation, it would be entirely appropriate for the Court to 
award the plaintiff in the divorce· settl'.e~rrent sufficient funds 
out of the marital assets with which to pay that obligation. 
In other words, in apportioning the assets between the plain-
tiff and the defendant, the Court is not limited in making that 
award based upon "legal obligations." The Court is at liberty 
to divide the assets of the parties in such manner as equity 
indicates. If it is proper for the plaintiff to honor his obli-
gation to his parents, whether legal or moral, the Court is not 
precluded from awarding him sufficient funds with which to do 
that. (The form of the award is secondary.) 
Nevertheless, we believe the evidence overwhelmingly 
indicates that it is a legal obligation. The understanding 
between the plaintiff and his father was that he would repay 
it when he was able, and the loans were to be repaid from the 
malpractice settlement money. 
It appears to be uniformly held that a "promise to pay 
when the promissor is able" is enforceable. Some courts take the 
position that such promise is absolutely enforceable, subject 
only to the condition that the promissor be given a reasonable 
time in which to perform. Other courts hold that such a promise 
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is enforceable at such time as the promissor is able to pay. 
See In Re Clover's Estate, 237 P2d 391 (Kansas, 1951), and 94 
ALR 721, on the question of ability to :e:-aY. "when able." See also 
17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts, Section 80. 
2. The defendant claims at page 19 of her brief: 
"The obligation is a gift." We believe that from what we have 
heretofore pointed out, that is obviously not the case. The rnon~ 
was furnished to the plaintiff upon the understanding that it would 
be repaid, and that is clearly inconsistent with the notion of a 
gift. It is true that the father had on occasion provided other 
sums to the plaintiff, particularly cash sums of under $25, of 
which no record was kept, and the plaintiff's father undoubtedly 
would have p~ovided more if he had been able to do so. But those 
considerations do not prevent the larger transactions from being 
loans, as was testified to by both the plaintiff and his father. 
3. The defendant asserts that the claim was barred by 
the statute of limitations. As an affirmative defense, this shoul 
have been raised in defendant's pleadings prior to trial to give 
plaintiff notice of this assertion. Nevertheless we respectfully 
submit that the defendant is in error for at least the following 
reasons: First of all, the statute of limitations would not begin 
to run until the debt became due inasmuch as the understanding 
between the parties was that the debt would have to be repaid when 
the plaintiff was able to pay it, and that contemplated a settle-
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ment of the malpractice action. We believe that the debt as 
understood by the parties did not become due until the malpractice 
action was settled, which was at or about the time of the trial in 
1979. 
It should be noted that in a contract payable when a 
person is able, it has been held that the statute of limitations 
does not begin to run until the promissor becomes able to pay. 
See In Re Clover's Estate, supra. 
The statute of limitations on the debts evidenced by 
checks would be six years and that in no instance would that time 
period have run as of the time of the trial.as the checks were 
dated 1974 or later. Furthermore).. the loans from plaintiff'·s 
father to the plaintiff constituted a series of transactions 
starting in 1973 and continuing thru to the time of the trial. 
Thus, as to the items not evidenced by a writing, we 
UCA, 1953, 
believe Section 78-12-25/would apply, which states: 
"An action upon a contract, obligation or liability 
not founded upon an instrument in writing; also upon an 
open account for goods, wares and merchandise, and for 
any article charged in a store account; also on an open 
account for work, labor or services rendered, or mate-
rials furnished; provided, that action in all of the 
foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within 
four years after the last charge is made or the last 
payment is received." (Emphasis added.) 
Further, if indeed defendant has been mentally incompe-
tent since 1973 (a legal guardian was appointed for her the day 
before the trial (R293)), Section 78-12-36, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, provides that the period of time a party is "mentally 
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incompetent and without a legal guardian" is not included within 
the period of the statute of limitations. The Court found, and 
the evidence is unconflicting that the moneys loaned were for 
family expenses and therefore we believe that this section would 
be applicable. 
The defendant apparently takes the position that the 
obligation to the parents is not enforceable because it does not 
fall within Section 30-2-9, UCA, 1953, which states: 
"The expenses of the family and the education of 
the children are chargeable upon the property of both 
husband and wife or either of them, and in relation 
thereto they m~y be sued jointly or separately." 
We believe that the expenditures referred to, being for groceries, 
for the family, clothing, medical expense, and other expenses of 
household, clearly falls within that .statute. It is difficult to 
imagine an indebtedness which more clearly meets the requirements 
of that statute. It should be observed, however, in thatconnec-
tion that even if this indebtedness were not a family expense, 
but rather were solely the indebtedness of the plaintiff, it 
would still be appropriate for the Court to make the order which 
was made. The divorce courts of this state are empowered to 
divide the assets and apportion the indebtedness of the parties 
in such manner as is equitable. Whether or not those debts are 
those of the plaintiff, or those of the plaintiff and the defend-
ant, is really immaterial. It is likewise immaterial whether the 
money was used for medical expenses for the defendant, for medical 
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expenses for the plaintiff, or for other household expenses such 
as food and the like, all are proper family expenditures. 
4. Defendant asserts that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to establish the amount of the debt. We submit that the 
debt was established by uncontroverted testimony, and the amount 
was established with reasonable certainty, and this is all that 
the law requires. See 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages, Section 25, and 
see also Howarth v. Ostergaard, 30 Ut 2d 183, 515 P2d 442 (1973). 
Finally, at page 13 the defendant asserts that, since 
the plaintiff's parents were not parties to the action, no award 
should have been made to them. It should be noted that the Court 
has not made an award to the par en ts. The Court has made an order, 
as it frequently does, as between the parties as to which of the 
parties will discharge a certain obligation. This the Court was 
entitled to do. The Court stated at paragraph 13 of the Supple-
mental Decree: "The indebtedness of the parties to the plaintiff's 
parents should be repaid in the amount of $10,205, and it is 
ordered that each of the parties assume and pay one-half of said 
amount and hold the other harmless from said one-half." 
We believe that it is worth noting that the defend-
ant apparently takes the position that the malpractice settlement 
is entirely hers, and at the same time takes the position that the 
money loaned by the parents to the plaintiff, but used for the 
family, is entirely plaintiff's responsibility. There appears to 
us to be a very significant inconsistency in this kind of reasoning. 
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with respect to the cases cited by defendant in her 
Point II, we desire to note: 
Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Ut 2d 433, 361 P2d 177 (1961), 
does not help defendant. Manwill requires that "promisee expected 
to be compensated" and that requirement is clearly met in the 
instant case. 
Mace v. Tingey, 106 Ut 420, 149 P2d 832 (1944), is dis-
tinguishable from the instant case. In Tingey the parties to the 
transaction were not able to testify to their intent as one of 
them was dead and the other was presumably barred by the dead 
man statute. In the instant case both-parties were available 
and did testify that the parents were to be ·repaid by the plain-
tiff when he was able. 
Because separate debts of the parties (as well as their 
joint debts) are proper subjects for equitable apportionment in 
a divorce case, (at least where, as in the instant case, they are 
reasonable and proper) the cases cited by defendant at page lSof 
her brief dealing with the family expense doctrine do not appear 
to be relevant. They are Berow v. Shields, 48 Ut 270, 159 P 538 
(1916), and Gilman v. Matthews, 20 Colo. App. 170, 77 P 366 (1904), 
For the same reason, Walker Brothers Dry Goods Co. v. 
Whitehall, 61 Ut 259, 212 P 523 (1923), cited by the defendant is 
not applicable. If the debt is owed by one spouse, it is irrele-
vant in a divorce case that the statute of limitations has run 
against the other. Further, as rioted above, defendant's incapac~ 
-46-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
would appear to toll the statute of limitations as to defendant 
in any case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff respectfully 
requests that the court confirm the lower court in awarding a 
divorce to the plaintiff (as well as the defendant). In addition 
plaintiff asks this court to direct that the parties repay to 
plaintiff's parents the full amount of $13,205 from the mal-
practice award, or at least that it be pa-id one-half by each of the 
parties, and finally the plaintiff ask~ this court to hold that 
no lien against the home be awarded to the defendant, and that 
thus the equity in the home of the parties be awarded in full 
to the plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted: 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
-47-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
